Could there be a Rule of Law Problem at the EU Court of Justice? by Halberstam, Daniel
Could there be a Rule of Law Problem
at the EU Court of Justice?
Daniel Halberstam 2020-02-23T22:54:22
The Member States’ current plan of replacing the sitting U.K. Advocate General at
the Court of Justice before the end of her six-year term raises a serious question
whether doing so may violate the European Treaties. If yes, this would be a troubling
intrusion on the independence of the Court and the constitutional structure of the
Union – just when the EU should be setting an example for the Member States (both
current and former).
It began on January 29, 2020, two days before Brexit. Having decided earlier that the
U.K. would lose its CJEU judge upon leaving the Union, the Member States turned to
the fate of the U.K. Advocate General. After observing that under Article 50(3) TEU
“the Treaties cease to apply to the withdrawing Member State from the date of entry
into force of the withdrawal agreement [WA],” i.e., February 1, 2020, the Member
States declared:
“The ongoing mandates of members of institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the Union nominated, appointed or elected in relation to the
United Kingdom’s membership of the Union will therefore automatically end
as soon as the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, that is, on
the date of the withdrawal.”
With Brexit, the U.K. Advocate General’s spot would therefore – so the January
Declaration – go into the hopper for the usual rotation, allowing Greece, up next,
to nominate a replacement for the “newly vacant post,” i.e. to serve out the AG’s
current mandate until 6 October 2021.
This raises a constitutional puzzle. Under EU constitutional law (i.e., the Treaties
and the Statute of the CJEU), it seems the U.K. Advocate General’s post is not
“newly vacant.” Indeed, unless the AG dies or resigns (Stat. CJEU Art. 5) or “in the
unanimous opinion of the Judges and Advocates General of the Court of Justice,
no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from h[er]
office,” (id., Art. 6), her post doesn’t appear vacant at all – at least not until her
current term runs out.
To be sure, the AG’s colleague, the U.K.’s CJEU Judge Christopher Vajda, has
already been let go on Brexit Day. But that move was lawful. After all, Article 19(2)
TEU provides: “The Court of Justice shall consist of one judge from each Member
State.” No Member State, no judge.
But aren’t Advocates General different? Even after the Nice Treaty – in an
unfortunate reaffirmation of national identification of high court judges – turned
what was previously an informal understanding into the legal requirement that each
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Member State have their judge on the Court, AGs were not to be so identified. There
have always been fewer AGs than Member States. Plus, the treaties glaringly omit
any requirement whatsoever connecting the former to the latter.
The system of appointment we all know, with “permanent” AGs from the big
Member States and rotating AGs from the smaller ones, is the stuff of non-binding
understandings. The principal textual indication comes from declarations, which,
unlike protocols, are non-binding statements, even when appended to treaties.
Declaration 38 (Treaty of Lisbon), for instance, indicated the Council will agree to
increase the number of AGs to eleven if the CJEU so requests, and further:
“In that case, the Conference agrees that Poland will, as is already the
case for Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, have
a permanent Advocate-General and no longer take part in the rotation
system, while the existing rotation system will involve the rotation of five
Advocates-General instead of three.”
The informality of such declarations seems evidenced by the colloquial use of the
word “have,” as though AGs were people or things to be had. More important, the
use of “will” instead of “shall” underscores that Declaration 38 is not legally binding,
but only a good will statement that the U.K. “will … have” an AG.
Doesn’t Declaration 38 thus merely establish a non-binding statement that the
other Member States will look kindly upon the U.K.’s nominee when considering
appointments to the Court? Declaration 38 does not purport to – nor, one would
think, could it – alter the constitutional rule that AGs “shall be appointed by common
accord of the governments of the Member States for six years.” (Art. 19(2) TEU).
And once appointed, the six-year mandate would seem to run unless the AG is
removed pursuant to Article 6 of the Statute of the CJEU.
The Member States might argue that the eighth introductory recital to the Brexit
Withdrawal Agreement “consider[s] the end, on the date of entry into force of this
Agreement, of the mandates of all members of institutions.” Moreover, the WA
defines “member of the institutions” to include Advocates General. (Art. 101 WA)
But this definition was “for purposes of this title [on the continuing privileges and
immunities of the members of institutions],” i.e., not necessarily for purposes of the
recitals.
Even if we read recital eight broadly, recitals (like declarations) generally have
no legal force. And while they may be used as interpretive aides, this seems
unnecessary where the Treaty is otherwise clear. Also, ought we not to shy away
from imposing national identifications on EU high court members unless inexorably
required by primary law? To be sure, invoking pragmatism in the face of Brexit,
Member States might argue the incongruity of a non-EU citizen serving on the
EU’s highest court. There is, indeed, an outdated (and again, non-binding) Joint
Declaration on AGs from 1995 invoking nationality. But isn’t that issue moot given
the well-known fact that AG Sharpston is (also) a citizen of Luxembourg?
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The final puzzle is this: By allowing the AG to stick around until her successor
arrives, don’t the Member States admit to her continuing authority serve? And isn’t
the only legal basis the AG’s appointment by common accord for “a term of six
years” (Art. 253 TFEU; cf. Art. 19(2)), and her duty to sit beyond that time until a
successor is picked (Art. 5, Statute CJEU)? If so, by what constitutional authority
may the Member States, by mere declaration or recital, terminate the Advocate
General early?
Fortunately, the fix to any such problem, if problem there is, would be easy. Just
treat the January Declaration as the non-binding statement it is, have Greece
continue with its selection, but make clear the AG’s replacement would – despite
any previous declaration – begin on October 7, 2021. That would safeguard the
independence of the Court, the rule of law, and the constitutional structure of the
Union.
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